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1. Two roles for meaning and understanding 
A teacher orders a student, ‘Add two’ (PI §185). The order means that the student is to write 
down the arithmetic sequence that begins with two and then proceeds by twos. The student 
understands this, and she writes down the correct sequence up to the point at which the teacher 
indicates she can stop.  
In this scene we see meaning and understanding at work, playing roles that they play 
familiarly and ubiquitously in our everyday life with language.  It is natural to look to philosophy 
for deeper insight into what these roles are and how meaning and understanding are able to play 
them. A central theme of the much-discussed sections §§138-242 of Philosophical 
Investigations, and of related remarks elsewhere in Wittgenstein’s later writings, is how easy it is 
for us to be led astray as we seek this deeper insight: how prone we are to fall into difficulty and 
confusion, and to lose our grip on the familiar phenomena whose depths we had sought to plumb. 
What roles are at issue? Here is one. In writing down 2, 4, 6, 8 and so on, the student 
responds to the order correctly. Had she written down another sequence—beginning, say, with 2, 
8 and 16—her response would have been incorrect. What makes it the case that writing down the 
first of these series counts as a correct response and that writing down the second does not? A 
natural answer to this question is that it is the order’s meaning: that it is because the order means 
that the student is to write down the sequence beginning with two and then proceeding by twos 
that the student must produce some initial portion of that very sequence if she is to execute the 
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order aright. As Wittgenstein’s interlocutor puts a thought in this vicinity, ‘The right step is the 
one that accords with the order—as it was meant’ (PI §186).  
An order to produce an arithmetic sequence provides a particularly sharp example of a 
phenomenon that appears to obtain much more generally: the meaning of an expression or 
utterance contributes to the determination of correct and incorrect, right and wrong, ways to use 
or respond to it. A meaningful item’s meaning helps to fix a norm, a standard of correctness, in 
the use of, or response to, the item. This norm-fixing power of meaning—what we might call 
meaning’s normativity—seems to be essential to it. Knowledge of the meaning of an assertion, 
for example, seems impossible without some knowledge of the circumstances under which it 
would be right to make it. 
It is widely recognized that Wittgenstein is interested in the thought that meaning is 
normative, and that he sees grave problems in what the interlocutor wants to say—and by 
extension, what we want to say, for the interlocutor is supposed to be our proxy—about how 
meaning inhabits its normative role.  Wittgenstein’s treatment of our difficulties in making sense 
of the normativity of meaning has been the central focus of the post-Kripkean (1982) literature 
on PI §§138-242 (for early touchstones, see Wright, 1984; McDowell, 1984; Boghossian, 1989). 
Work in this vein has been highly visible, and has spawned an interest in the normativity of 
meaning as such, quite apart from the question of the interpretation of Wittgenstein. ‘The 
normativity of meaning’ now labels a subfield in the philosophy of language, whose mandate is 
to explore the nature and structure of the normative role of meaning in the context of 
contemporary thinking about semantics and pragmatics. (See Wikforss, 2001, for an influential 
early treatment; Hattiangadi, 2007, for a book-length discussion; and Ginsborg, 2011, for an 
incisive review of Hattiangadi.)  
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I said that the scene from PI §185 illustrates work done not just by meaning but by 
understanding. Indeed, Wittgenstein discusses understanding in PI §§138-242 at least as much as 
he discusses meaning. What issues are at stake in his treatment of understanding? One plausible 
candidate is, again, normativity. Just as we may speak of the student's response as being in 
accord (or conflict) with the order’s meaning, so we may speak of that response as being in 
accord (or conflict) with her understanding of the order’s meaning. In light of this observation, it 
might look tempting to organize our reading of Wittgenstein's treatment of understanding around 
the issue of normativity (see, e.g., McDowell, 1998a). But while Wittgenstein is certainly 
concerned with difficulties in our achieving a satisfactory view of how understanding can bear 
normatively on use, it would be a serious mistake to suppose that this is the only relationship 
between understanding and use our grasp of which is under scrutiny in this region of the 
Investigations.  
Consider the following remark: 
Perhaps you will say here: to have got the system (or, again, to understand it) can't 
consist in continuing the series up to this or that number: that is only applying one's 
understanding. The understanding itself is a state which is the source of the correct use. 
(PI §146) 
It is not, or not simply, a thought about normativity that is the focus here. The interlocutor 
objects to the proposition that understanding the series of natural numbers consists in continuing 
the series up to some point or other, on the ground that this overlooks the distinction between 
understanding and ‘applying one’s understanding’. And the idea that understanding is something 
we might ‘apply’ cannot be analyzed simply in terms of the idea that understanding bears 
normatively on our use. In particular, applying one’s understanding of the series cannot just be a 
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matter of producing a series that is in accord with one’s understanding. Consider the distinction 
between following a rule and merely acting in accordance with a rule (cf. PG p.101, BB p.13). 
Following the rule for the Fibonacci series, I write down, ‘1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13’. What I have 
written is in accord with any number of rules for arithmetical series. But I am following only 
one: the rule for the Fibonacci series. Analogously, the student’s writing down, ‘2, 4, 6, 8’ in 
response to the order accords with any number of possible understandings of the order’s 
meaning. But the student is not thereby ‘applying’ all of these different understandings. The 
interlocutor’s suggestion, brought to bear on this case, is that the student is applying one 
particular understanding, namely, the understanding of the order she in fact has at the time she 
gives her response. 
What does it add to the observation that a person’s behavior accords with a certain 
understanding of an order that she is applying that understanding of the order? Whatever else we 
might want to say about it, it is clear that the additional ingredient has an explanatory aspect. To 
say that the student is applying a certain understanding of the order in responding to it is to offer 
an explanation of her response; it is to say that she responds to the order as she does because she 
understands the order in that particular way. It is this explanatory role that the interlocutor 
endeavors to capture in speaking of understanding as the ‘source’ of use.  
Perhaps owing to its preoccupation with normativity, the secondary literature on PI 
§§138-242 and related regions of the later work has generally failed to recognize that 
Wittgenstein is as concerned with the explanatory role of understanding as he is with the 
normative role of meaning and understanding (though see Haase, 2009, for a noteworthy 
exception). To correct for this imbalance, I will in this chapter press on the scales the other way. 
I will sketch out a dialectic between Wittgenstein and his interlocutor centered on the 
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explanatory role of understanding. We will see that various elements in the text become clearer 
when viewed in this light.  
As I implied above, the proximate cause of the secondary literature’s intense focus on 
normativity is Kripke (1982). But that the book has had this influence shows that it itself has 
been subject to an unduly narrow reading. Kripke’s skeptical argument, as with the 
Wittgensteinian material that is its inspiration, is as much concerned with the explanatory role of 
understanding as it is with the normativity of meaning. A further goal of this chapter is to 
provide the material for a fresh engagement with Kripke’s seminal text. 
 
2. The guidance conception of understanding 
What is it to apply your understanding of the meaning of an expression or utterance when you 
use or respond to it? The interlocutor has a single underlying idea about how to answer this 
question, which he offers in a variety of guises throughout PI §§138-242. His master thought is 
that applying one’s understanding is a matter of being guided by an item in one’s mind. To 
understand an expression’s or utterance’s meaning is to have an item in your mind that you can 
consult when you need to use or respond to the expression or utterance, and that will then show 
you how to proceed. Let us call this idea the guidance conception of understanding (cf. Stroud, 
1996).  
Consider the proposal that ‘what really comes before our mind when we understand a 
word’ is a ‘picture’ (PI §139). For example, ‘when you hear the word “cube”’, a ‘drawing of a 
cube’ comes ‘before your mind’ (PI §139).  Let us say you are participating in an object-
identification task: various things are placed before you in succession, and you are told to point 
at something if and only if it is a ‘cube’.  An object is presented that is not a cube—say, a 
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triangular prism—and you refrain from pointing at it. Why? It looks like a perfectly good answer 
to this question that the word ‘cube’ called to your mind a picture of a cube, and it was evident to 
you that ‘this use of the word [i.e. pointing to the prism] doesn’t fit the picture’ (PI §139). The 
interlocutor’s thought is that it is in such transactions with inner or mental guides that the 
application of understanding consists. 
We noted in the previous section that the idea of applying one’s understanding, like the 
idea of following a rule, has an explanatory aspect. There is at least this to be said for the 
guidance conception: the form of explanation to which it connects the application of 
understanding is one that is familiar and unmysterious.  We do often, in everyday life, explain 
people’s performances by citing their consultations with guides, with items that show or tell 
them what to do. In PI §1, for example, the shopkeeper chooses the right color of apple because 
he consults a chart of color samples. It is true that the consultation the interlocutor envisions is 
not with a physical object but with an item ‘before the mind’. But we can consult and be guided 
by such items. If I am asked to determine whether it is appropriate to apply to a given object a 
word for a shade like ‘royal blue’ or ‘teal’, it can certainly help me to bring to mind images of 
objects that have been previously presented to me as representatives of the meanings of these 
words—say, an image of a certain sweater. 
In the interlocutor’s proposal about ‘cube’, the mental item that one is said to consult is 
an image of the object or kind of object for which the word stands. The example just mentioned 
suggests a closely related proposal for color-words: that these words call to mind images of 
objects that are samples of the appropriate shades and colors (see PI §239). But there are less 
pictorial ways to develop the idea of inner guidance. In the case of the math teacher’s order, the 
interlocutor suggests that the student has an image, not of the sequence of numbers she is 
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supposed to embark upon writing down (after all, the sequence is infinitely long), but of an  
‘algebraic formula’, and that she is then able to determine what to write through a ‘derivation’ 
from that formula (PI §146). Elsewhere he shifts away from visual imagery entirely, and 
suggests that one might hear an ‘inner voice’ telling one what to do, which one then ‘obeys’ (PI 
§213). And no doubt there are other possibilities: what we need to fill out the conception for a 
given kind of expression or utterance are mental items that we can make sense of, in some way 
or another, as potential guides in the use of or response to expressions or utterances of the kind. 
But however the conception is spelled out, it is hopeless, and its hopelessness is a central 
message of this region of the Investigations. The problem turns on the following simple point: an 
item cannot succeed in guiding you a particular way, in showing you to do some particular thing, 
unless you understand it to show you that.  The shopkeeper’s color chart, with its juxtaposition of 
the word ‘red’ and a sample of red, cannot guide the shopkeeper to grab red apples unless he 
understands it to have that significance. A parallel point goes for any object, be it physical or 
mental, that is to instruct or direct one to proceed in some particular way: the object can play that 
role only if you understand it to provide those instructions or directions.  As Wittgenstein says of 
the ‘inner voice’, ‘if it can guide me right, it can also guide me wrong’ (PI §213). And we may 
add, it can fail to guide me at all. Which of these eventualities obtains will depend upon what, if 
anything, I understand the inner voice to be telling me to do. 
The point can be put this way: if the guidance conception were correct about the 
connection between use and understanding that obtains when a subject applies her 
understanding, then that connection would depend upon the subject’s having a second-order 
understanding, an understanding of the inner item whose presence constitutes her original 
understanding. And this circumstance raises an obvious question: how are we to conceive the 
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role of the second-order understanding in bringing about the subject’s uses and responses? In 
particular, does the second-order understanding guide the subject’s responses to the item 
constituting her first-order understanding? 
Neither a positive nor a negative answer to this question is satisfactory. If the proponent 
of the guidance conception answers no, then while his conception implies a role for a second-
order state of understanding in facilitating the competent use of language, it provides no account 
of the way in which that state fulfills that role. And yet the point of the guidance conception was 
to illuminate the role of understanding in facilitating performances. If we see a need for such an 
account, why should the need not be as pressing with respect to the understanding of mental 
guides as it is with respect to the understanding of public expressions and utterances? The 
guidance conception, if applied only to first-order states of understanding, seems just to contrive 
to push the locus of our puzzlement further inward and so out of view. 
But on the other hand, if the proponent of the guidance conception answers yes, then he is 
faced with a regress. The item constituting the subject’s second-order understanding can guide 
her to a particular response to the item constituting her first-order understanding only if she 
understands it as doing so. Thus a third-order understanding comes into play. And our question 
simply recurs. (See PI §239 for a concise articulation of the dilemma just traced.) 
Faced with this difficulty, there is a temptation to suppose that mental items are different 
from their external counterparts in just the way needed to prevent a regress. The temptation, in 
other words, is to think that we can posit mental guides without being saddled by questions about 
second-order understandings. Mental guides are special. Perhaps we seek to capture their 
specialness by holding that they are ‘self-interpreting’ (Fogelin, 2009, p.19). Or we say, as does 
Wittgenstein when confronted with the observation that the same mental picture might be taken 
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to speak either for or against applying ‘cube’ to a triangular prism, ‘I should have thought that 
the picture forced a particular use on me,’ with the elaboration that he had thought the forcing or 
‘compulsion’ at stake here to be not ‘psychological’ but ‘logical’ (PI §140). Talk of logical 
compulsion or self interpretation attempts to express the idea that a mental guide provides for its 
own understanding, thereby relieving the subject of the burden of doing the understanding 
herself.  
As Wittgenstein realizes, the ‘thought’ that tempts him is not even false: there is no 
genuine idea here but only the illusion of one. (PI §140 goes on: ‘How could I think that? What 
did I think?’, and finds no satisfactory answer to the second of these questions.) If an item is to 
bear on a person’s use of ‘cube’ by showing her how to apply it, then she must grasp what she is 
being shown. There is no getting around the fact that her understanding the item in this way will 
be a state of her. And so there is no getting around the fact that when we conceive the 
relationship between the mental item and the subject’s performance as one of guidance, we are 
committed to the presence of a second-order state of understanding on the part of the subject. To 
insist that the mental item interprets itself, or provides for its own understanding, is in effect an 
attempt to sidestep this simple point of logic. It is to claim that the subject both understands the 
item (because she is guided by it) and doesn’t understand the item (because the item does the 
work of understanding itself).  However special the mind may be, it cannot be as special as to 
serve as a locus of logically-contradictory states of affairs. 
 
3. Mind as mechanism 
Why does Wittgenstein spend so much time on the guidance conception? The interlocutor’s 
seemingly inexhaustible penchant for promoting that conception must speak to Wittgenstein’s 
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sense of the appeal, even inevitability, that the conception has for us when we reflect 
philosophically on the role of understanding in explaining performance. But what is supposed to 
be the source of the appeal? In this section and the next I offer an answer to this question. 
Wittgenstein tell us that when the interlocutor conceives the relationship between the 
student’s understanding and her performance on the model of a ‘derivation of a series from its 
formula’—which we have noted to be a version of the guidance conception—she is supposing 
that ‘[t]he understanding is a state which is the source of the correct use’ (PI §146). I quoted this 
remark in the first section as evidence of the interlocutor’s conviction that the understanding 
stands in an explanatory, and not just normative, relationship to use. But it is now important for 
us to register that Wittgenstein does not mean the interlocutor’s remark merely to assert the 
existence of an explanatory relationship between understanding and use; it is meant further to 
gesture toward a particular way of viewing the nature of the explanatory relationship that obtains 
between them.  
Wittgenstein expands upon this view a few passages later: ‘If one says that knowing the 
ABC is a state of the mind, one is thinking of a state of a mental apparatus (perhaps of the brain) 
by means of which we explain the manifestations of that knowledge’ (PI §149). For the 
interlocutor, one’s knowledge or understanding is to be seen as a state of a ‘mental apparatus’, 
and as explaining one’s uses and responses as ‘manifestations’. Wittgenstein does not speak of a 
mental ‘apparatus’ [‘apparats’] elsewhere. But the talk of an apparatus is clearly a 
terminological variant on his frequent ascriptions to the interlocutor of an inclination to posit the 
existence of mental ‘mechanisms’ (see, in addition to the examples cited below, PI §157, §613, 
§689; BB p.40, p.97; see also the closely related talk of the mind as a ‘medium’ at PI §102, §109, 
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§308; Z §273; BB p.3, p.5, p.43). For Wittgenstein, the interlocutor’s attachment to the guidance 
conception is one manifestation of this inclination. 
What is involved in thinking of understanding as a state of a mental apparatus or 
mechanism? The crucial point is that if we are to conceive understanding in this way, then ‘there 
ought to be two different criteria for such a state: a knowledge of the construction of the 
apparatus, quite apart from what it does’ (PI §149; see also BB p.118, PG p.104). That is to say, 
it belongs to the concept of an apparatus or mechanism that it is possible to characterize a 
component of an apparatus in two ways, either in relation to what the apparatus does or in 
relation to the way in which the apparatus is constructed. To take a familiar example, we might 
characterize a carburetor in terms of its contribution to an engine’s work of burning fuel to 
produce motion (namely, its mixing fuel and air and sending it on to the combustion chamber) or 
in terms of its physical characteristics (e.g., its shape, the alloys of which it is composed.). Let us 
call the distinction here exemplified as that between characterizations at the level of activity and 
characterizations at the level of construction. Wittgenstein’s point is that if we are to make good 
on our vision of the understanding as a state of a mechanism, we must find both construction-
level and activity-level characterizations of that state. 
The parenthetical bit in the above quotation—‘a state of a mental apparatus (perhaps of 
the brain)’ might seem to indicate that the interlocutor is open to viewing the mind as a physical 
mechanism, with construction-level characterizations of its states to be couched in physical (e.g., 
neurophysiological) terms.  But that is not the interlocutor’s usual orientation (cf. Goldfarb, 
1992). On the contrary, when he is struck by the ‘curious effects’ that the ‘mechanism of the 
mind’ seems capable of producing, he is inclined rather to suppose ‘no physical mechanism 
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could behave in this way’ (BB p.5). He thus seeks to understand the processes of the mind as 
exercises of a purely ‘psychical mechanism’ (BB p.12). 
Now, the idea of a non-physical mechanism might seem a complete non-starter, 
suggesting configurations in some wispy spiritual material. And sometimes Wittgenstein does 
ascribe such a vision to his interlocutor: ‘If one says that thought is a mental activity, or an 
activity of the mind, one thinks of the mind as a cloudy gaseous medium in which many things 
can happen which cannot occur in a different sphere, and from which many things can be 
expected that are otherwise not possible’ (PG p.100). But if we interpret the idea of mechanism 
at a certain degree of abstraction, we can make better sense of what it could be to understand the 
mind as a non-physical mechanism, and we can see in particular why Wittgenstein regards the 
guidance conception as an attempt to understand the mind in this way. The crucial point is that 
we should hear the requirement of ‘knowledge of the construction of the apparatus’ (PI §149) as 
at a bottom a demand for context-independent characterizations of the apparatus’s states and 
processes. 
To elaborate: when we give activity-level characterizations of the states and processes of 
an object whose activity interests us, our characterizations will often relate the object to the 
environment in which it is situated. This will be so, for example, if our characterizations refer to 
interactions between the object and other particulars; it will also be so if the characterizations 
place what the object does in the context of larger systems or patterns of activity, involving other 
goings on in the world around it. In such cases, the concepts we bring to bear in specifying the 
object’s activity will be such that recognizing those concepts to apply to the object and its doings 
will involve recognizing the object to stand in certain relationships to elements in its 
surroundings. The call for a ‘construction’-level characterization of a mechanism should be 
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understood as a call for an alternative set of concepts applicable to the object’s states and 
processes, concepts whose suitability for such application we can recognize without our needing 
to bring into view the way in which the object is related to its surroundings. The aim, in other 
words, is to find characterizations of these states and processes such that we can abstract from 
the context in which the object is embedded—such that we can, as it were, blot out the world 
around the object—and still be in a position to make sense of, and see the applicability of, these 
characterizations.  
To construe the mind as a mechanism is thus, as the passage just quoted from PG says, to 
think of it as a ‘sphere’, as a self-standing realm. But the form of self-standing-ness that is at 
stake is not fundamentally spatial or material (or pseudo-spatial and pseudo-material, as in talk 
of a gaseous medium): it is conceptual. What is self-standing, in the first instance, is our 
understanding of the states and processes of the object when we are conceptualizing them at the 
level of ‘construction’. When we describe the student as responding to the teacher’s order by 
writing out the correct series, we obviously do not satisfy the context-independence requirement. 
For we locate her activity in a complex context, involving both social interaction with a 
particular other person and participation in ongoing linguistic practices. A mechanistic account 
of the role of the student’s understanding in facilitating her response will seek to bring the state 
of understanding into view for us in a way that does not depend upon our grasp of these larger 
circumstances of the student’s activity. The hope is that we will then be able, on the basis of the 
characterizations, to gain a distinctive kind of insight into the mental processes that provide for 
the student’s successful participation in the communicative interaction with the teacher. The aim 
of interpreting complex nexuses of activity through analysis into independently explicable 
mechanisms is a regulative ideal in many of our most fruitful ways of explaining what goes on in 
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the world; it can be very tempting to suppose that we should seek such illumination into the 
activity of the mind as well.  
Framing the idea of mechanism in terms of this abstract explanatory ideal, we can grasp 
why Wittgenstein regards the guidance conception as an attempt to treat the mind as a 
mechanism. The conception holds that a state of understanding is constituted by an item in the 
mind capable of guiding your performance. When you act upon your understanding, you consult 
the relevant item, and it shows you what to do. Now, on every variant of the conception the 
interlocutor proposes, the posited guiding item is what people tend to call a ‘mental image’—a 
presence in the sensory or perceptual imagination. This is not a coincidence; it is internal to the 
conception. We cannot make sense of the idea of a consultation with an inner guide without 
having recourse to the quasi-perceptual relationship in which a subject stands to her mental 
images. The conception requires us to find inner items that can be intelligibly understood as 
showing or telling us things, and the quasi-perceptual presentness of a mental image—the mode 
of presentness that can make it seem appealing to say of an image that ‘it comes before the 
mind’s eye’ (PI §56)—fits it uniquely for that role.  
At the same time, it is the imagistic character of the hypothesized understanding-
constituting items that can make the guidance conception seem like an attractive candidate for a 
mechanistic treatment of the states and processes of the mind that involve understanding. If we 
think of the student’s state of understanding as constituted by the occurrence in her mind of an 
image—say, of the formula ‘x+2’—we have access to a way of thinking about that state that 
does not depend upon our grasp of the context of the teacher’s and student’s interaction. 
Moreover, there is a tempting picture of mental imagery according to which we need essentially 
no context in view in order to make sense of a person as having a certain image. On this picture, 
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concepts of the enjoyment of mental imagery are atomistic: our recognizing them to apply does 
not depend upon our recognizing the subject to satisfy other concepts (at least outside of a very 
small circle). One way of arriving at this picture is to suppose that we know what it is to have a 
certain image immediately from our own case, and that to conceive someone else as having a 
comparable image then requires nothing more than conceiving her as having what we have. This 
kind of thought is, of course, equally tempting in the case of sensation.
1
 If we allow the concept 
of sentience to encompass not just sensation and perception but exercises of the sensory and 
perceptual imagination, then we have an attractive way of locating the guidance conception in a 
long-standing empiricist tradition: that of attempting to explain sapience (as exemplified by, say, 
the student’s competent response to the teacher) in terms of sentience. 
This atomistic picture comes under severe criticism later in the Investigations, first with 
respect to sensation and then with respect to images.
2
 But we do not in fact need to appreciate the 
untenability of that picture to see that the guidance conception fails in its aim at providing a 
mechanistic treatment of the application of understanding. For even if we were to grant that the 
guidance conception satisfies the context-independence requirement in its characterizations of 
states of understanding, the question would remain how we are to understand its treatment of the 
explanatory relationship between such states and the subject’s performances. And as we have 
already seen, this treatment is subject to a regress; it presupposes the very nexus for which it is 
supposed to account.  
                                                 
1 At the limit, the thought that we need no conceptual background for making sense of applications of a given concept 
shades into the thought that our confrontation with the relevant phenomenon involves no conceptualization at all. Here we are in 
the territory of the Myth of the Given. For an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s treatment of sensation that casts Wittgenstein as 
targeting a Mythical conception of sensation, see McDowell (1998b). 
2 For the case of images, see the sections beginning around PI §361. The idea that we can straightaway make sense of 
supposing that a chair speaks to itself (PI §361) is a natural outgrowth of the thought that we know what it is to have images from 
our own case, and can then simply project the having of them onto another object. Wittgenstein’s general prescription for 
avoiding such confusions—‘One ought to ask, not what images are or what happens when one imagines anything, but how the 
word “imagination” is used’ (PI §370)—applies to imagery an analogue to his point, discussed below, about the importance of 
keeping in view the ‘context’ or ‘circumstances’ in which we say a person understands. 
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The guidance conception is just one stab at a mechanistic treatment of the mind. We 
might take the lesson of its failure to be that we should seek a different such treatment. But that 
is not the moral Wittgenstein wants us to draw: he wants us to give up the search for mental 
mechanisms entirely. Consider the following passage from Philosophical Grammar: 
The problem that concerns us could be summed up roughly thus: ‘Must one see an image 
of the colour blue in one’s mind whenever one reads the word “blue” with 
understanding?’ People have often asked this question and have commonly answered no; 
they have concluded from this answer that the characteristic process of understanding is 
just a different process which we’ve not yet grasped. [… ] Well, ‘Understanding’ is not 
the name of a single process accompanying reading or hearing, but of more or less 
interrelated processes against a background, or in a context, of facts of a particular kind, 
viz. the actual use of a learnt language or languages. (PG p.74) 
The realization that understanding a word needn’t involve an image coming before one’s mind 
when one hears or reads the word should not prompt us to look for a different ‘characteristic 
process of understanding’. Rather, it should prompt us to take seriously the observation that 
understanding takes place against a ‘background’ or ‘context’, comprising such facts as ‘the 
actual use of a learnt language’. Wittgenstein’s exposition implies that acknowledgement of the 
importance of this ‘background’ stands in opposition to the search for a ‘characteristic process of 
understanding’. To search for such a process, then, must be to seek a way of conceptualizing 
understanding that does not depend upon our grasp of the role of the background; it must be to 
seek concepts capable of providing context-independent characterizations of states and processes 
of understanding. To give up the search for the ‘characteristic process’ is just to give up the 
attempt to arrive at a mechanistic account of the operations of understanding. 
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The same dialectic is traced, if a bit less explicitly, in the more well-known remark PI 
154.  There Wittgenstein cautions against construing your coming to understand the principle of 
a series as a process that takes place ‘behind or side by side’ a formula’s for the series occurring 
to you.  To construe understanding in this way would be to miss that it is a complex context of 
‘particular circumstances’ that makes it intelligible to suppose that you come to understand when 
the formula occurs to you.  Here again, what is at stake in the rhetoric to which the interlocutor is 
drawn but which Wittgenstein wishes to resist—in this case, talk of a mental process that occurs 
‘behind or side by side’ imaginative presences—is the impulse to seek a context-independent, 
mechanistic account of understanding. 
 
4. Rationality and guidance 
The move that I credited to Wittgenstein at the end of the previous section might strike a 
contemporary philosopher as unconvincing. Why should the moral of the defeat of the guidance 
conception be that we should abandon the search for mechanistic accounts of the mind entirely? 
This can look like a huge leap. In particular, Wittgenstein’s failure to seriously consider the 
prospect of treating the mind as a physical mechanism might, with the benefit of hindsight, seem 
a serious lacuna. Contemporary mainstream philosophy of mind conceives itself as a part of 
cognitive science, with the project of cognitive science being to explain mental phenomena in 
terms of computational processes whose implementation in neural activity is in principle possible 
(if empirically very difficult) to describe. The development of cognitive science is one of the 
great intellectual achievements of recent decades. In light of this, the idea that the mere 
untenability of the guidance conception should force us to give up the search for ‘the 
characteristic process of understanding’ might seem to epitomize the scientific no-nothingism 
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that Burge (2010) argues was endemic in 20th-century philosophy of mind and epistemology. 
And indeed, Burge faults the later Wittgenstein in particular as a bad influence on the tradition: 
‘His emphasis […] on the complex background to any linguistic references led others to seek in 
linguistic usage a basis for understanding the representational aspects of experience, indeed of all 
objectivity’ (2010, p.128). This linguistic orientation is one prominent manifestation of the 20th 
century ‘hyper-intellectualism’ (2010, pp.13, 27) that, in Burge’s view, made a clear-eyed 
appreciation of the perceptual basis of objective thought impossible—with contemporary vision 
science now providing the needed corrective. 
In fact the interlocutor’s (and Wittgenstein’s) relative lack of interest in the potential 
fruits of the psychological sciences is not a sign of ignorance or antipathy to science, but of 
insight into the nature of the interlocutor’s explanatory project.  
The interlocutor’s topic is the role of understanding in explaining performance.  In 
particular, he wants to give a mechanistic account of the role ascribed to understanding in our 
ordinary, everyday appeals to understanding in the explanation of people’s uses of and responses 
to language.  Let us now register two related features of that role that we have not yet had 
occasion to consider explicitly. When we cite a person’s understanding of meaning to explain her 
uses of, or responses to, meaningful items, we typically do so in the service of representing her 
uses and responses as rational and self-conscious. Suppose that while we are building an IKEA 
bookshelf, you ask why I attached a certain board to the base using a certain screw, and I answer 
that that is what I understand the instructions to say to do at this stage. It will be natural for you 
to understand me as portraying myself as having a reason, a justification, for doing what I did, 
and as explaining my action in terms of that reason or justification: I am telling you that I acted 
as I did for the reason that the instructions said to do so. I thus represent my action as an exercise 
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of rationality, of the capacity to respond to reasons. What role is here played by my 
understanding of the instructions? Since the reason my explanation represents me as acting on is 
a function of what the instructions mean, my appreciation of this reason depends upon my grasp, 
my understanding, of that meaning. The role of my understanding of the instruction’s meaning is 
to bring the reason into view for me. It thus necessary for the self-consciousness of my exercise 
of rationality: to my knowing myself to be acting for a reason provided by the meaning of the 
instructions. 
The explanatory nexus into which the interlocutor wishes to achieve insight is one in 
which the subject does what she does because of her recognition of a justification she has for 
doing that. The interlocutor wants to find a context-independent way of identifying the states and 
processes involved in this nexus, but he does not want to thereby lose sight of the elements of 
self-consciousness and justification. Precisely not: his aim is to capture these elements in the 
workings of a mechanism.  
It is in virtue of this aim that the guidance conception can seem uniquely attractive. First, 
as we have already noted, concepts of mental imagery can appear to possess a highly atomic 
character, and hence to enable the framing of context-independent specifications of mental states. 
But second, the concept of possession of a mental image incorporates the idea of self-knowledge: 
it is part of the idea of having, e.g., a certain visual image that I know myself to be having it.  
And third, the concept of guidance, of being shown or told how to do something, introduces an 
element of justification: when one is shown or told how to do something, one is thereby given a 
reason for proceeding in a particular way. Of course, our appreciation of this reason depends 
upon our understanding of what we are being shown or told to do, and it is just this point that 
ensnares the guidance conception in a regress. But if we have not yet thought through the 
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conception with enough clarity to see the inevitability of regress, then in light of the three points 
just listed, the conception can seem to provide a satisfying mechanistic analysis of just the 
explanatory nexus we are trying to understand. It is much less obvious how, starting with 
naturalistic characterizations of states of the brain, we could work our way up to capturing the 
elements of self-consciousness and rationality that are definitive of this nexus. 
If the appeal of the guidance conception, as an account of acting on an understanding of 
meaning, lies in its apparent potential to show how self-consciousness and rationality can be 
incorporated into the workings of a mental mechanism, then we should expect the interlocutor to 
find it tempting in a wider range of cases—indeed, perhaps, in the case of any exercise of self-
conscious rationality. It is in this light that we should view the lengthy set of remarks on 
reading—glossed as ‘the activity of rendering out loud what is written or printed’—that 
Wittgenstein interpolates into his discussion of the student’s understanding of the teacher’s 
order. Since Wittgenstein is explicit that understanding the meaning of what one is reading is not 
essential to reading as he wants to conceive it, the placement of these remarks can seem 
puzzling, and it is perhaps for that reason that they have received comparatively little attention in 
the secondary literature. A brief examination of their purport will help to reinforce the 
interpretation I have offered here of Wittgenstein’s concerns in PI §§138-242.   
The discussion of reading is largely given over to querying what role the idea of a felt 
experience of ‘influence’ or ‘guidance’ should play in our reflections on the nature of the activity 
of reading aloud. The first point to note for our purposes is that Wittgenstein is explicitly 
concerned with the question of whether such an experience might be connected to the self-
conscious rationality of the activity of reading aloud: 
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One might […] say, I feel that the letters are the reason why I read such-and-such. For if 
someone asks me ‘Why do you read such-and-such?’—I justify my reading by the letters 
which are there. 
 This justification, however, was something that I said, or thought: what does it mean 
to say that I feel it? I should like to say: when I read I feel a kind of influence of the 
letters working on me. (PI §169) 
We can tease apart two thoughts under scrutiny here. One is that the written letters provide my 
reason for reading aloud what I do, a reason I recognize myself to have and can articulate if 
asked to do so. My saying what I do is an exercise of self-conscious rationality, in which the 
written letters provide the justification I have, and know myself to have, for what I say. The 
second thought is that I feel this reason or justification as I read aloud, a feeling that can be 
characterized as that of ‘a kind of influence of the letters working on me.’  
Wittgenstein does not reject the first of these thoughts. To the contrary: he allows that we 
do say and think that we acted for a reason provided by the letters, and there is no indication that 
he regards us as mistaken for saying or thinking this. It is rather the second thought that is his 
target: 
[The thought] that we felt the influence of the letters on us when reading […] appeals to 
us especially when we make a point of reading slowly—perhaps in order to see what does 
happen when we read. When we, so to speak, quite intentionally let ourselves be guided 
by the letters. But this ‘letting myself be guided’ in turn only consists in my looking 
carefully at the letters—and perhaps excluding certain other thoughts. (PI §170) 
The feeling of being guided or influenced by the letters—which is supposed to constitute our 
awareness of the letters providing us with a reason—seems most apparent when we intentionally 
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‘let ourselves be guided’ by what is written. But letting oneself be guided the letters, 
Wittgenstein tells us, just consists in looking at the letters carefully and ignoring distractions. 
The evident implication is that any special ‘feeling’ to be found when we ‘let ourselves be 
guided’ must just be a matter of what it feels like to look at something carefully, to focus one’s 
attention.  
Wittgenstein clearly regards this observation as undermining the point of our initial 
appeal to the distinctive ‘feeling’ of guidance. Why does it do so? What, indeed, was the point of 
the appeal? The answer is that we had hoped that the feeling of guidance constituted awareness 
of a ‘mechanism’ that effects the transition from our seeing the written letters to our speaking 
them aloud:  
We imagine that a feeling enables us to perceive as it were a connecting mechanism 
between the look of the word and the sound that we utter. For when I speak of the 
experiences of being influenced, of causal connexion, of being guided, that is really 
meant to imply that I as it were feel the movement of the lever which connects seeing the 
letters with speaking.  (PI §170) 
Once we realize that the feeling of guidance is just the feeling of paying close attention to 
something and related phenomena, we are supposed to see that it is not plausibly understood as 
constituting a peek at the workings of a ‘connecting mechanism’. 
Let us draw all these points together. Reading words aloud is an exercise of self-
conscious rationality. The words on the page justify my saying what I do, and it is because of my 
recognition of the justification they provide me that I act. The interlocutor wants to account for 
this explanatory relationship mechanistically, but he wants to do so in a way that captures the 
self-conscious rationality in play. So he imagines a ‘connecting mechanism’ his access to which 
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is not third-personal and theoretical—as it would be if we were positing some physical, say 
computational, process mediating the transition from perception to performance—but first-
personal and experiential—a matter of his felt awareness of the letters he sees guiding what he 
says. The appeal to the experience of being guided by the letters is meant to play a role 
analogous to the appeal to images in the case of the guidance conception of understanding. In 
both cases, the aim is to identify items in the realm of sentience that constitute processes of 
sapience—or as we can now say, of self-conscious rationality.  In both cases, finally, 
Wittgenstein traces the failure of the attempt to an insufficient appreciation of the multiplicity of 
circumstances that we must have in view to grasp the phenomena at issue (see PI §172-173). 
 
5. Kripke on rationality and guidance 
Kripke (1982) has played a decisive role in shaping the literature on Wittgenstein’s remarks on 
meaning and understanding. The skeptical paradox outlined in that book is almost always read as 
centered on the question of how to account for the normativity of meaning. As I mentioned at the 
outset, this interpretive assumption is at the root of the great interest in the normativity of 
meaning in recent decades. 
There is no question that Kripke’s skeptic has the normativity of meaning in view: he 
criticizes various candidate accounts of the constitution of meaning, such as dispositionalism, on 
the ground that they fail to accommodate normativity. But the exposition of the skeptical 
paradox is complicated and multifaceted. Intertwined with the examination of our various failed 
attempts to provide for normativity is an additional thread of skeptical thought whose concern at 
its core is to establish our inability to account for the explanatory role that we ordinarily suppose 
a person’s grasp of meaning to play. I have suggested that this role should be understood in terms 
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of the contribution of the subject’s understanding of meaning to her exercise of self-conscious 
rationality in using and responding to expressions and utterances. And I have argued that the 
interlocutor is attracted to the guidance conception because it seems to provide a way of gaining 
a distinctive kind of insight into the workings of self-conscious rationality in such cases. In this 
closing section, I will show that Kripke’s skeptic shares just this commitment of Wittgenstein’s 
interlocutor. Indeed, the Kripkean skeptic’s commitment to the guidance conception is absolute: 
he believes the failure of the conception to provide a satisfactory account of the putative rational-
explanatory role of understanding implies that it cannot in fact play this role. 
To see that Kripke, at least some of the time, frames the skeptical paradox as concerned 
with the rational-explanatory role of our grasp of meaning, consider the following passage: 
Almost all of us unhesitatingly produce the answer ‘125’ when asked for the sum of 68 
and 57, without any thought to the theoretical possibility that a quus-like rule might have 
been appropriate!  And we do so without justification.  Of course, if asked why we said 
‘125’, most of us will say that we added 8 and 7 to get 15, that we put down 5 and carried 
1 and so on.  But then, what will we say if asked why we ‘carried’ as we do?  Might our 
past intention not have been that ‘carry’ meant quarry; where to ‘quarry’ is …?  The 
entire point of the sceptical argument is that ultimately we reach a level where we act 
without any reason in terms of which we can justify our action.  We act unhesitatingly 
but blindly (1982, p.87, ellipsis in original). 
The question with which the skeptical argument is here said to be concerned is ‘why we 
said ‘125’’.  This is an explanatory question about an action of ours; it asks why we responded as 
we did when presented with a certain problem framed using ‘+’.  The import of the skeptical 
argument, as here represented, is that what we are inclined to say in answer to this question does 
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not have the substance we credit to it.  We think we can explain why we said ‘125’ by 
identifying our reasons for giving that response, reasons we recognize ourselves to possess in 
virtue of understanding the terms in which the original arithmetical problem was posed to us.  
But as Kripke sees it, this attempt at explanation does not succeed. For it prompts a further 
explanatory question, one now targeting our understanding of the terms in which we couched our 
explanation.  Whatever we say in response to this question will raise another question along the 
same lines, ad infinitum. The implication of this regress is that ‘ultimately we reach a level 
where we act without any reason in terms of which we can justify our action.’  At this level, we 
act ‘blindly’: we do not act for any justifying reasons furnished by our knowledge of the meaning 
of ‘+’ or other relevant expressions. That our action is blind in this sense is ‘the entire point of 
the skeptical argument’. (In this paragraph I follow Bridges, forthcoming.) 
It is in relation to the idea that grasp of meaning can put us in touch with reasons, reasons 
upon which we may then self-consciously act, that we should hear remarks such as, ‘The sceptic 
argues that when I answered “125” to the problem “68+57”, my answer was an unjustified leap 
in the dark’ (1982, p.15). To take an unjustified leap in the dark is to act while lacking a 
justification, a reason, for which one thus acts. The skeptic is here represented as arguing that I 
do not have a reason for answering as I do, and so a fortiori, that I do not have an understanding 
or grasp of the problem’s meaning that furnishes me with awareness of such a reason. Of course, 
our ordinary presumption is that we do have such reasons for using and responding to 
expressions and utterances as we do. That is why the claim to the contrary amounts to a kind of 
skepticism. 
How does Kripke’s skeptic get to the conclusion that linguistic uses and responses are 
invariably unjustified stabs in the dark? Here is not the place to reconstruct the skeptic’s line of 
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thought in detail. What matters for present purposes is one feature of this line of thought: that it 
rests on an assimilation of acting for a reason provided by one’s grasp of meaning to being 
guided by an item that constitutes one’s grasp of the meaning. In the course of his discussion of 
dispositionalism, for example, Kripke writes, ‘So it does seem that a dispositional account 
misconceives the sceptic’s problem—to find a past fact that justifies my present response. As a 
candidate for a “fact” that determines what I mean, it fails to satisfy the basic condition on such a 
candidate stressed above on p.11, that it should tell me what I ought to do in each instance’ 
(1982, p.24). Here the demand to state the reason for which I give my response gets transmuted, 
without comment, into the requirement that we identify an item that ‘tells’ me what to do.  
This is not an isolated instance, and cannot be dismissed as a rhetorical flourish. The idea 
that there must be an item in my mind that in some sense or another shows me how I am to 
proceed is everywhere present in the exposition of the skeptical paradox, and our inability to find 
any regress-proof candidates for this item is precisely what motivates the skeptical conclusion. 
For example: 
Sometimes when I have contemplated the [skeptical paradox], I have had something of an 
eerie feeling. Even now as I write, I feel confident that there is something in my mind—
the meaning I attach to the ‘plus’ sign—that instructs me what I ought to do in all future 
cases […] But when I concentrate on what is now in my mind, what instructions can be 
found there? How can I be said to be acting on the basis of these instructions when I act 
in the future? […] To say that there is a general rule in my mind that tells me how to add 
in the future is only to throw the problem back on to other rules that also seem to be 
given only in terms of finitely many cases. What can there be in my mind that I make use 
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of when I act in the future? It seems the entire idea of meaning vanishes into thin air 
(1982, pp.21-22). 
The parallel between Kripke’s skeptic and Wittgenstein’s interlocutor that emerges here 
is striking. It suggests that the real source of meaning skepticism lies in a deep commitment to 
our uncovering a mechanistic basis for any supposed exercise of self-conscious rationality.  As a 
corollary, it suggests that we can defeat the specter of meaning skepticism if we can come to see 
why such an account does not have to be possible. 
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